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This study presents the initial findings of a household survey
dealing with the effects of the Argentine economic crisis on
welfare. It also seeks to identify the coping mechanisms and
strategies adopted by households in these difficult times.
The results obtained confirm the negative image reflected
in the macroeconomic indicators, identify the limitations of
the different coping mechanisms and reveal serious effects
on welfare. The evidence suggests that the effects on the
use of health services have been more marked than those on
the use of education services.
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I
Introduction
Argentina is currently in the midst of a deep and
unparalleled economic, social and political crisis. After
three consecutive years of recession, the economic and
financial crisis deepened during 2001. Various attempts
were made during that year to restart growth as a prelude
to improving the public finances and the debt profile,
but to no avail. Efforts to halt a run on the banks (the
corralito restricting withdrawals) constrained liquidity
and economic activity and generated popular unrest.
All this culminated in the resignation of President de la
Rúa in December 2001, a quick succession of appointed
presidents, a formal default on public-sector debt
repayments and, in early 2002, the abandonment of the
Convertibility Plan.
After four years of recession, the economy is
projected to shrink by about 16% in 2002, bringing the
decline in GDP to over 25% since its 1998 peak. With
the peso depreciating sharply since its float and a lack
of direction in monetary policy, Argentina is
experiencing significant inflation for the first time since
1991. Between the decline in economic activity and
the depreciation of the currency, per capita GDP has
collapsed to a projected US$ 2,850 in 2002 (down from
US$ 8,210 at its peak in 1998).
The downturn in the second half of 2002 sharply
aggravated the already difficult social conditions in the
country. Already high levels of unemployment (18.3%
in October 2001) jumped to 21.5%, according to official
figures for May 2002.1  Moreover, job losses
(particularly unskilled jobs) have been widespread.
During the first quarter of 2002 the construction
industry (vital for unskilled labour) shrank by 25% with
respect to the last quarter of 2001 (42% with respect to
the first quarter of 2001).2  Poverty is also on the
increase, confirming the link between economic crises
and rising poverty (Lustig, 2000). Official estimates
for 28 urban centres indicate that poverty rose from
38.3% in October 2001 to 53% in May 2002. This
extremely negative environment has also had a strong
impact on the health and education sectors, where there
is growing evidence of deterioration in service delivery.
The combination of all these factors has resulted in an
increasingly fraught social situation with high levels
of crime, violence and protests of various kinds.
This paper summarizes the initial results of a
household survey conducted expressly to gauge the
effects of the economic crisis on household welfare and
identify the coping mechanisms and strategies adopted
by Argentine families in these hard times. Specifically,
the survey was designed to identify changes in income,
consumption patterns, access to social and other
services, saving and payment patterns, labour-market
participation and reliance on formal and informal
safety-net mechanisms. Additionally, the survey sought
to collect information on changes in the mental and
emotional state of individuals.
The survey is nationally representative, covering
2,800 households in different regions.3  Unlike most
other surveys in Argentina, including the INDEC
Standing Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares – EPH), this one included small settlements
(less than 2,000 inhabitants) and thus provides a better
insight into such areas. It did not include areas of
scattered population, however, and thus does not present
a full picture of Argentina’s heterogeneous rural sector.
For urban areas, the sample design was based on a
stratification by city size and by region. Settlements in
rural areas were selected randomly. While an effort was
made to include settlements in different regions, the
sample was not large enough to be representative at
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the regional level. Overall, the survey design allows
comparisons with the Standing Household Survey for
urban areas.
The first part of the questionnaire asked for
information on all household members and included
questions on demographic characteristics, employment,
income, migration status, education level, health coverage
and social security contributions. Several of these questions
were retrospective, using October 2001 as the reference
point. Individuals were asked about their individual
employment and non-employment income (cash and kind)
and about official and unofficial income transfers.
The second part of the questionnaire took the
household as its unit of analysis. The questions were
answered by the head of household (or the best
informed individual in the household).4  Questions were
asked on the use of savings, changes in consumption
patterns and participation in social programmes and
community activities. Respondents were also asked
about their mental and emotional state and their
expectations for the future. The questionnaires for urban
and rural areas differed slightly to capture specificities
related to those areas. The fieldwork was conducted in




Table 1 presents the basic information on incomes yielded
by the survey. Reported monthly per capita income from
all sources averaged 214.6 pesos.5  This compares with
an average income of 233 pesos estimated by INDEC for
urban areas in May 2002. Standard procedures were used
to adjust per capita income using the adult-equivalency
scale (to reflect differences in consumption needs),
yielding an average monthly income of 264 pesos. Some
standard inequality measures are also presented, and
these confirm the relatively high level of income
inequality observed in the Argentine household surveys.
As mentioned earlier, a special feature of this
survey is the inclusion of rural areas that are not covered
by the Standing Household Survey. Table 2 confirms
TABLE 1
Argentina: Mean income, by quintile,
June 2002
Quintile Adult-equivalent Per capita
household income household
(pesos)   income
Mean (pesos) Share (%) Mean (pesos) Share (%)
Ia 40.5 3.1 32.0 3.0
II 107.4 8.1 85.9 8.0
III 182.7 13.8 146.3 13.7
IV 300.1 22.7 240.9 22.5
V 690.8 52.3 564.7 52.8




a First quintile includes households reporting zero income.
b Y10/Y1 is the ratio of mean incomes in the highest and lowest
deciles of the distribution. Y1 does not include those reporting
zero income.
TABLE 2
Argentina: Mean income, by areas
(Pesos)





4 If the household head did not know the answer to a particular
question (e.g., changes in consumption patterns) the household was
visited up to three times to find a member who did.
5 Owing to the known difficulties that household surveys have in
obtaining reliable data on income levels, a question was devised for
those respondents who preferred not to report the exact amount of
their earnings. They were asked to select the range that best reflected
their own income (which was imputed by taking the average of each
interval). This allowed the number of households with incomplete
information on income to be reduced from 17.2% to 7.6%. When
individuals did not report their earnings from work, these were
estimated using Mincer equations, whereby the logarithm of hourly
earnings is defined as a function of observable individual attributes
such as sex, education, age and experience. The Heckman method was
used to correct for selection bias. The absolute and relative effects of
these corrections on incomes are insignificant (per capita income
increases from  212 pesos to 214 pesos) (Heckman, 1979, pp. 153-161).
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the well known (but not necessarily well established) fact
that urban incomes are higher, with a gap of about 60%.
To identify the effects of the crisis on family
incomes, the survey asked each household to state
whether its current income had changed (in nominal
terms) from what it was in October 2001. Table 3 shows
that over 40% of households reported no change in
income while almost 50% reported a reduction in
nominal income. Interestingly, about 8% of households
reported higher incomes.
The information collected gives no indication of
the extent to which these changes influenced income
distribution, as the retrospective questions did not refer
to “levels” of income. Table 4, however, shows the
incidence of change according to the education level
of the head of household, a proxy for household income.
It is interesting to note that the highest incidence
of income loss was in households headed by individuals
with secondary education, a group that tends to be
located in the middle of the income distribution (“the
middle class”), while the lowest incidence was in
households headed by individuals with incomplete
primary education, a group that tends to be at the bottom
of the income distribution scale (“the indigent”). This
information suggests that the middle classes might have
been the most seriously affected by the economic
crisis.6
The case of the approximately 8% of households
reporting an increase in income since October 2001 is
of particular interest, given the extremely negative
economic performance during this period. Table 5
provides some clues to the main reasons behind this
increase in nominal incomes.
In almost half the cases, the reported increase in
income is associated with a change in employment
characteristics: a new worker in the family (most in
temporary, informal jobs), a move to a better paying
job, or more hours worked. The other half of the cases
do not show any noticeable change in employment
characteristics for any of the household members. In a
little over 20% of cases, it is possible to identify an
increase in non-employment incomes as the principal
source of change.
2. Employment
The survey also inquired about the employment status
of individuals and changes in this respect since October 2001. The results indicate a stable activity rate (i.e., no
net change in labour-force participation) of about 40%,
with an increase in the unemployment rate of about
3% combined with a reduction in the employment rate
(as a proportion of the population) of slightly more than
6 During the 1990s, by contrast, economic shocks had a profounder
effect on the poor and those with the lowest education levels. See
World Bank (2000 and 2001).
TABLE 3
Argentina: Changes in income





Argentina: Changes in income, by education
level of household head
Education level
Increased No change Decreased Total
Incomplete primary
education 4.25 50.14 45.61 100
Primary education 7.81 44.85 47.34 100
Incomplete secondary
education 15.44 34.52 50.04 100
Secondary education 6.72 39.51 53.77 100
Incomplete higher
education 6.83 45.94 47.23 100
Higher education 8.91 41.24 49.85 100





More people working 15.0
Changed jobs 14.1
Worked more hours 14.4
Same job/same hours 31.7
Higher non-employment income 22.3
Other 2.5
TABLE 6




Employment rate 29.9 31.1a
Activity rate 39.8 39.8a
Unemployment rate 24.9 22.0a
Unemployment rate (EPH) 21.5 18.3
a Based on retrospective information from survey respondents.
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1%. The Standing Household Survey (EPH) found a
similar increase in the unemployment rate (from 18.3%
to 21.5%) in 28 urban centres, although the levels were
slightly different.
These aggregate numbers mask significant changes
in the employment position of specific households.
Table 7 provides a summary of these, using the answers
to the retrospective questions to focus on changes in
employment status between October 2001 and the time
of the survey.
The stability of labour-force participation can be
confirmed by comparing the numbers in the “inactive”
category on the two sides of the matrix. The number of
individuals leaving the workforce (most of them
previously unemployed) is similar to the number
entering (most of whom remain unemployed). A more
detailed analysis shows that these are mostly “secondary
earners” in households which have another member
working.
Unsurprisingly, the number of individuals losing
jobs exceeds the number finding them. As table 8 shows,
those moving out of unemployment are more likely to
be secondary workers than those losing their jobs,
indicating some changes in family roles which will be
analysed later.
The third factor worth mentioning is an apparent
deterioration in the “quality” of jobs. This is reflected
in the type of employment reported both by those who
obtained new jobs (which tended to be temporary rather
than permanent and, if permanent, more likely than not
to be completely lacking in standard formal-sector
benefits) and those who changed jobs (a net increase
in the proportion of temporary jobs and, in the case of
new permanent jobs, a high proportion without
benefits). Approximately 6% of those in work reported
losing at least some type of benefit. This is consistent
with the trend revealed by the Standing Household
Survey.7
The sharp deterioration in formal-sector
employment is confirmed independently by the
Ministry of Labour Survey of Employment Indicators
(Encuesta de Indicadores Laborales – EIL), which
TABLE 8
Argentina: Groups experiencing change,
by position in household and gender
 Unemployed to Employed to
employed (%)  unemployed (%)
Position in household   









Argentina: Changes in employment status
(Thousands and percentages)
Previous status
Unemployed Inactive Permanent job Temporary job Total
Unemployed 1000s 1 435 1 228 15 555 3 233
% 50.6 6.2 0.2 17.1 9.9
Inactive 1000s 1 039 18 252 20 386 19 696
% 36.7 92.5 0.3 11.9 60.0
Permanent job 1000s 113 91 6 498 331 7 034
% 4.0 0.5 92.6 10.2 21.4
Temporary job 1000s 247 153 485 1 969 2 854
% 8.7 0.8 6.9 60.8 8.7
Total 1000s 2 834 19 725 7 018 3 241 32 817









7 For example, the proportion of wage earners without benefits
increased from 33% to 35% between the October 2001 and May
2002 Standing Household Surveys.
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covers more than 1,500 firms representing a universe
of approximately 38,000 companies of various sizes
and in different sectors that employ approximately 1.9
million registered workers in the three largest urban
centres (Greater Buenos Aires, Greater Rosario and
Greater Córdoba). As figure 1 shows, formal
employment is estimated to have fallen by 7.4% since
October 2001, and by 10.5% since June 2001.8
3. Poverty
On the basis of the income data for June, the incidence
of poverty was estimated using four different lines. First,
we used the official “poverty” and “indigence” lines
estimated by INDEC for the month of June 2002.9 For
rural areas, use was made of the poverty line for the
urban centre in the same region. This does not take
account of potential urban/rural price differences, of
course, but it does at least control for regional
differences (World Bank, 2001).10  In addition, a one
dollar and two dollar a day poverty line was constructed
using the standard World Bank methodology for the
country as a whole.11 The national results are shown in
table 9.
Table 10 gives the results for urban and rural areas.
A few points should be highlighted. First, the
incidence of poverty/indigence (using the official lines)
confirms the predictions made in the early stages of
the crisis, which suggested poverty rates of about 50%
and indigence rates of about 25%. Official estimates
from the Standing Household Survey yield similar
poverty and indigence rates (53% and 24.8%,
respectively), although with narrower coverage owing
to the exclusion of rural areas from the survey. Second,
bearing all the necessary considerations in mind, it is
important to note that the two dollar a day poverty line
is very close to the official indigence line which, in
principle, gives a better sense of how poverty in post-
default Argentina compares to international levels.
Third, and again with all the necessary methodological
caveats, even though the incidence of poverty/indigence
is, as expected, much higher in rural areas, including
these areas in the estimation does not have a significant
effect on national rates, given the relative size of the
two groups.
4. Subjective welfare
With the exploratory purpose of identifying changes in
the mental and emotional state of individuals (“how
8 Additional data supplied by the Administración Federal de
Ingresos Públicos (AFIP) give similar results: the monthly jobs total
was 10.1% lower in the first quarter of 2002 than in the same period
the previous year.
9 The basic food baskets were originally estimated for each urban
centre on the basis of 1997 consumption patterns and were adjusted
to reflect April 2001 prices in each centre using the INDEC consumer
purchasing power parity index for that month. The lines were then
updated to the month of June using the variation in prices in Greater
Buenos Aires. The absence of systematic price information for all
urban centres is a serious limitation. Comparison of changes in
food prices in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza and Tucumán
during the first six months of 2002 shows a slightly larger increase
in the interior than in Greater Buenos Aires.
10 A more in-depth analysis of poverty in rural areas will be
conducted separately.
11 The poverty lines were constructed using the 1993 purchasing
power parity (PPP) index for Argentina (PPP = 0.7779) and were













Greater Buenos Aires: Formal employment
Source: Encuesta de Indicadores Laborales (EIL).
TABLE 9
Argentina: Poverty indices, June 2002
(Percentages of individuals)
 World Bank Standing Household
survey  Survey (EPH)
June 2002 May 2002 October 2001
Poverty 53.7 53.0 38.3
Indigence 23.8 24.8 13.6
PPP (1 dollar) 9.9 9.5 7.5
PPP (2 dollars) 24.6 20.8 17.1
TABLE 10
Argentina: Poverty indices
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people feel”), the survey asked people whether they
“felt discouraged” and/or “hopeless about the future”.
They were asked to identify the main reasons for these
feelings and say how they felt before October 2001.
As table 11 shows, the survey indicates a high and
increasing incidence of discouragement and pessimism
among respondents (mostly heads of household).
Table 12 provides further evidence for the source of
this discouragement/pessimism among those reporting
such feelings. “Economic reasons” predominate over
all others.
In the case of those who said they felt discouraged
now but not before October 2001, the aim was to
ascertain whether this change was associated with the
respondent’s employment position. As table 13 shows,
this does not appear to be the case. Similarly, there was
no identifiable pattern associated with income
distribution. These findings suggest that the economic
crisis affected people’s emotional state across the board.
5. Social unrest
The survey confirms a sizeable increase in the
participation of individuals in various forms of social
protest, which rose from 7.6% before October 2001 to
16.2%. Interestingly, participation increases up the
income distribution scale. This is consistent with
another finding of the survey: the most popular form
of protest was the cacerolazo, or pot-banging (9.2%
participated), a form of protest that became highly
popular in the major urban centres during the first
quarter of 2002.12
Violence appears to be an important factor in the
post-crisis period. As table 15 shows, 20% of
households claimed to have fallen victim to crime or
violence in the previous six months. It is interesting to
note that while the highest-income group reported the
highest incidence of crime or violence, there is no
simple correlation between income level and the
likelihood of experiencing crime.
The data are consistent with the information
collected by the Dirección Nacional de Política
Criminal for Greater Buenos Aires, Rosario and
Córdoba, which indicated that 13% of respondents had
TABLE 11
Argentina: Changes of emotional state
(Percentages)
Feel discouraged Feel hopeless about the future
Now Before October 2001 Now Before October 2001
Never 26.8 47.8 21.1 45.5
Sometimes 34.2 37.3 33.2 36.2
Often 24.8 9.6 27.5 11.3
Always 13.5 4.0 16.7 4.8
No response 0.6 1.3 1.5 2.2
Total 100 100 100 100
12 Lower-income groups participated mainly in pickets or road
blockades.
TABLE 12
Argentina: Reasons for emotional state
(Percentages)
Feel Feel hopeless
discouraged about the future
Cannot find a job 11.3 12.7
Difficulties with job 1.6 1.6
Economic reasons 53.4 54.0
Health reasons 4.8 3.0
Something hard to explain 16.1 15.4
Other reasons 12.8 13.4
Total 100.0 100
TABLE 13
Argentina: Employment position of those
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experienced some type of crime during 2000 (Dirección
Nacional de Política Criminal, 2000). The information
does not show significant differences among socio-
economic groups but does reveal that higher-income





Argentina: Participation in social protests
(Percentage of households participating)
Quintile I II III IV V Total Total before October 2001
11.4 12.6 17.5 17.5 22.0 16.2 7.6
TABLE 15
Argentina: Exposure to crime and violence
(Percentage of households)
Quintile I II III IV V Total
19.7 22.9 14.5 19.9 25.3 20.4
In this third section, the focus is on strategies adopted
by households to cope with the crisis. First, there is a
general description of the main types of strategies
followed by households. These are grouped into three
categories: i) adaptive household strategies, ii) active
household strategies and iii) social network strategies
(Loskin and Yemtsov, 2001). This is followed by
analysis of the components of each category and
identification of patterns indicating that certain
strategies tend to be followed by different types of
households (depending on income level, for example).
It must be stressed that this is a first, exploratory step
to prepare the way for a subsequent multivariate
analysis of coping strategies.
1. Overview
As indicated earlier, the survey asked about the
strategies most frequently used by households to cope
with the worsening economic conditions experienced
over the previous eight months.
The first set of strategies, which have been grouped
under the term adaptive household strategies, includes
those of households that responded to the crisis by
changing their consumption patterns, including the use
of various types of services. The second set of strategies,
termed active household strategies, involves making
increased use of the physical, financial and human
assets available to the household. These strategies
include bringing further household members into the
workforce, working longer hours, selling assets, using
savings, borrowing and migration. The last group, social
network strategies, includes strategies that rely on
assistance from friends, family, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or the government.
Table 16 summarizes the key information on the
use of these different strategies by families generally
and, more specifically, by families whose household
income fell.
A first aspect to be noted is that almost all
households, regardless of whether they experienced
changes in income, said they had altered their
consumption patterns in response to the economic crisis.
This is true across the income distribution spectrum
(table 17). Argentine families have, indeed, adapted to
the economic crisis by changing their consumption
patterns.
Furthermore, with the exception of active
strategies, which tend to be used more intensively by
households whose income has fallen, no noticeable
pattern is observed between the two groups in the use
made of this broad set of coping strategies. However,
when attention is focused on income groups (table 17),
regardless of whether or not income has fallen, it
becomes apparent that the use of social network
strategies is strongly correlated with income levels.
Over and above these general patterns, as will be
seen below, significant differences are found among
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the various groups once the broad categories are broken
down.
2. Household adaptation strategies
Table 18 summarizes the types of changes made by
households in their expenditure patterns. What it reveals
in particular is a tendency to reduce consumption levels
and switch to cheaper products. A distinction is made
between essential (food) and non-essential (other)
items.
Broadly speaking, table 18 shows that all families
have reacted to the economic crisis by combining lower
consumption with a switch to cheaper goods, be these
essential or non-essential.13  Having said this, two
patterns can be discerned. Firstly, and unsurprisingly,
higher-income groups appear to have avoided such
changes to a greater extent. This is particularly true in
the case of food, where the difference between income
quintiles is striking. Secondly, switching to cheaper
TABLE 16
Argentina: Use of strategies by households
 % of households using % of households where income has fallen using
i) Adaptive strategies 98.2 99.1
ii) Active strategies 37.3 45.0
iii) Social network strategies 32.7 36.4
Do not use any of these strategies 1.5 0.8
Use at least one of them 98.5 99.2
Use at least two of them 54.7 61.6
Use all of them 13.6 17.8
TABLE 17
Argentina: Use of strategies, by income quintilea
(Percentage of households using them in each quintile)
Quintile I II III IV V Total
i) Adaptive strategies 99.8 98.1 98.9 97.3 96.6 98.2
ii) Active strategies 47.0 37.7 36.1 30.5 30.7 36.4
iii) Social network strategies 55.5 39.1 38.4 24.2 12.0 33.8
a The quintiles in this section are constructed with the same number of households in each, ranked by family income adjusted for household
size (using adult equivalents) and excluding households for which information is incomplete.
TABLE 18
Argentina: Use of adaptive strategies, by income quintile
Changes in consumption patterns I II III IV V Total
Food  
Lower consumption 90.4 83.1 73.2 69.0 59.1 74.9
Switch to cheaper products 97.6 95.4 92.5 91.5 84.8 92.3
Other goods  
Lower consumption 90.5 87.7 81.5 76.8 68.3 81.0
Switch to cheaper products 89.5 89.3 80.4 80.2 76.6 83.2
Purchase of second-hand products 51.7 40.2 34.8 33.0 24.3 36.7
Dispensing with/reducing use of domestic servicea ... ... 43.0 27.8 40.5 37.9
a Estimated only for those households for which this was an option and only when a sufficient number of cases was observed.
13 The consumer price index rose by 30% during the first six months
of 2002. Food prices rose by more (39%) than the average. Using
the expenditure shares for the lowest quintile yielded by the 1997
consumption survey, we estimate that the cost of living for the
poorest groups in society rose by 45% over the period.
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products (or second-hand ones when available) appears
to be a more common response than cutting
consumption levels. In other words, the information
suggests that families have tried to maintain food
consumption as far as possible by reducing the
consumption of other goods and switching to less
expensive products. Not surprisingly, the lower-income
groups seem to have been less successful at this.
The survey also reveals changes in use of and
access to various types of services (specifically
education, health and public services).
A question that deserves particular attention –and for
which a separate analysis is being conducted using various
sources of information– is whether there is any evidence
of a higher school drop-out rate as a result of the economic
crisis. Preliminary indications from the survey provide
limited evidence of such an effect. Table 19 includes three
age groups: 6 to 12, 13 to 15 and 16 to 18. The second
column gives rough estimates of coverage rates for each
group, without reference to the level of schooling. With
all their limitations, these data confirm the rates
traditionally ascertained from household surveys and show
no sign of a decline in coverage.
The survey also sought to ascertain whether there
was any indication that children reported as not
attending school during the first months of the 2002
school year had actually dropped out. Household heads
were asked whether anyone in the household (they were
not required to say who)14  had either dropped out of
school or postponed attendance since October 2001.
The third column shows what percentage of children
in the age group concerned are not in school and belong
to a family in which at least one member has dropped
out of school or postponed attendance. Of course, this
might mean that the numbers dropping out are
overestimated if more than one household member
dropped out or delayed the start of classes (including
higher education); this being the case, it is an estimate
of the maximum potential size of the effect.
The first thing to be noted is that, given the very
small number of cases involved, the estimates are not
sufficiently precise (i.e., have a high coefficient of
variation). Taking this into account, it is apparent that
there is no evidence of children in the 6 to 12 or 13 to
15 age brackets dropping out and there is a small (but
not statistically significant) percentage of drop-outs in
the 16 to 18 group.
As a consistency test, we checked the latter group’s
position in the household income distribution. As table 20
shows, the few students who do seem to have dropped
out belong mainly to the lowest deciles of the distribution,
which does lend further plausibility to the evidence.
The limited evidence on changes in school drop-
out rates as a result of the crisis could indicate that
families are trying hard under difficult circumstances to
protect what is perhaps the most important type of
investment they can make in their children (De Ferranti,
Perry and others, 2000). Evidence from other crises
suggests, however, that the negative effects might be felt
not immediately but several months after the onset of
the crisis (e.g., in 2003 enrolment rates). Furthermore,
the data from the survey do not tell us how many children
are not attending school regularly, which may be a more
prevalent type of adjustment in many cases.
Table 21 provides some further evidence as to
whether families made adjustments that affected their
children’s education. The percentage of families
switching schools (to less expensive private schools or
from private to State schools) is very small, suggesting
an unwillingness to make such changes even in the face
of a sharp economic deterioration.
On the other hand, a very large proportion of
households (particularly in the lower income groups)15
14 This avoided the “shame” effect that might have caused the
numbers dropping out to be underreported, at the cost of losing
information on exactly which member of the household was
concerned.
TABLE 19
Argentina: Have families taken children out of school?
 Going to school (% of whole group) Estimated drop-out rate
Age group All areas Urban areas Rural areas All areas
6 to 12 97.0 97.3 92.1 0.2
13 to 15 92.5 92.5 90.9 0.6
16 to 18 80.2 81.1 60.1 2.3
15 Almost 90% of households in the lowest income quintile reported
cutting back their purchases of school materials, as against only
43% of those in the highest quintile.
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reported reducing their purchases of school materials;
the effects on the quality of schooling remain to be seen.
The difficulties experienced by several provinces in
keeping up spending levels suggest that restrictions on
the supply side may be more serious than those on the
demand side, at least at this early stage of the process.
In the case of health services, there is evidence of
serious negative impacts since early 2002, in the form
of difficulties both in the social health insurance system
and the public health system. The information collected
through the survey confirms the trends identified
previously.
Approximately 12% of individuals experienced
some change in health insurance coverage (table 22).
More than 60% of these, mainly in the lowest-income
groups, lost their coverage altogether. Of those whose
health insurance coverage changed, this change was to
lower coverage in 40% of cases. Almost half of those
who were previously covered twice (by the obra social
and prepaga systems) now maintained only their
primary (obra social) health insurance. There was also
a shift from full private insurance to emergency
insurance only.
The loss of health insurance coverage is leading
an increasing number of people to rely on public health
facilities. Of those households reporting that they had
switched from private coverage to public health services
because of the economic crisis, 60% had lost their
private coverage or seen it restricted in some way. More
specifically, 16% lost their coverage altogether, 5%
could not use it because they had debts outstanding,
13% could not afford to pay their share of services, 8%
experienced a reduction in the services covered by their
insurers and 13% were retirees experiencing difficulties
with the services offered by the Instituto Nacional de
Servicios Sociales para Jubilados y Pensionados
(PAMI).16
Overall, the survey found that families had cut back
on health services in one way or another as a result of
the economic crisis. A few findings are worth
mentioning. Almost 23% of households reported that
at least one member had been unable to obtain access
to health services at some time. Three quarters of them
gave the reason as a “lack of money” to pay for
medicines (44%), transportation costs (25%) and
contributions (5%). More specifically, 37% of
households with children under the age of 12 said they
were taking their children for medical check-ups less
often. Almost 45% of these households belonged to the
lowest quintile of the income distribution. But this effect
was also felt in the second (29%) and third (18%)
quintiles.
Cutting down on the use of utility services appears
to be another strategy followed by households.
Typically, this involves either halting or delaying
payments (with the risk of being cut off) or simply
asking for the service to be suspended. Between 30%
and 50% of households said they had delayed payments.
The percentage of households saying that various
services had been cut off (electricity, gas, water,
telephone, cable, Internet) ranged from 2% (in the case
of the water supply) to 14% for cable television. In most
cases, the main reason was non-payment.
Similarly, households have begun to make
greater use of cheaper forms of transport, as table
23 shows. More than half of households that
previously used only public transport now report that
they are making more journeys by bicycle or on foot.
A similar switch from cars and taxis to public
transport is observed as well.
TABLE 20
Argentina: School drop-out rates
(Percentages)







Argentina: Adjustments in education
expenditure
(Percentages of households)
Switched from a private school to a State one 2.0
Switched to a cheaper private school 3.1
Bought fewer school materials 71.9
TABLE 22
Argentina: Changes in health
insurance coverage
(Percentages of individuals experiencing
a change in coverage)
Quintile I II III IV V Total
Lost all coverage 76.0 61.1 78.6 52.6 33.6 61.4
Changed coverage 24.0 38.9 21.4 47.4 66.4 38.7
16 PAMI is the national health insurer for retirees.
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These figures are consistent with official data on
the use of public services,17  according to which
passenger numbers fell by 22% on urban railways, 9%
on underground railways and 14% on metropolitan bus
services in the first five months of 2002 (Estadísticas
de Servicios Públicos, 2002).
3. Active household strategies
Table 24 summarizes some of the active measures
adopted by households in response to the economic
crisis. In only 13% of households did a new member
enter the labour force.
This is a particularly important resource in the
lowest-income group (table 25). The new worker is
typically a secondary one: in 50% of cases it is the son
or daughter and in 25% it is the spouse of the person
identified as the household head. The effectiveness of
this strategy, however, appears to be rather limited. A
little over 13% of these new entrants succeed in finding
a job, and those who are successful tend not to be the
poorest.
Working longer hours appears to be another
strategy followed by all income groups. However, it
tends to be mostly salaried workers in permanent jobs,
particularly in trade, that appear to succeed in the effort
to increase working hours.
Alongside these changes in employment strategies,
there is an observable tendency to replace leisure with
work at home as a way of coping with the crisis. Two
examples are worth mentioning. First, approximately
60% of households reported that they had increased
the time allocated to the preparation of “home-made
goods” (e.g., meals) to replace purchased goods. As
table 25 shows, this strategy is widely used by the
lowest-income groups. Second, households employing
domestic workers cut back substantially on their use.
The survey also inquired whether a household
member had migrated since October 2001 or if someone
in the household was considering that option. On
average, a little over 4% of households reported having
at least one member that had emigrated, and this
percentage held fairly steady across the income
distribution.18  The main reasons for migration included
“lack of work” (58%) and the desire for a better quality
of life (15%). Again, more than 20% of households
reported that at least one family member was
considering migrating. The main option being
considered (80% of households overall, with the largest
proportion being found among the highest-income
groups in the City of Buenos Aires) was emigration to
another country.
Since the crisis began, a larger proportion of
households have been using their savings, selling assets
or borrowing to keep consumption levels up (see
table 26).
Perhaps the most interesting finding is the degree
to which lower-income households rely as a coping
strategy on the informal credit granted by
neighbourhood stores (compra al fiado), which enables
them to delay payment (table 27).
4. Social network strategies
Table 28 summarizes some of the main indicators of
social network use by households. Table 29 provides
further information broken down by income group.
Overall, more than a third of households report
benefiting at least in some respect from access to a social
support network. Use of such strategies is somewhat
higher among households that experienced falls in
nominal income (table 28) and significantly higher
among households at the bottom of the income
distribution scale (table 29).
The survey provides some evidence that social
networks are used differently depending on income
level. Certainly, if the income distribution is compared
with the distribution of households claiming to have
received assistance from or given it to people not living
in their own household, it transpires that households in
TABLE 23
Argentina: Changes in use
of transport services
Quintile I II III IV V Total
From cars/taxis
to public




cycling/walking 73.9 62.5 61.3 49.0 33.5 55.4
17 Estadísticas de Servicios Públicos (2002). These statistics are
collected monthly by INDEC and form the basis for its synthetic
public services indicator (Indicador Sintético de Servicios Públicos
– ISSP).
18 This excludes those emigrating as a result of marriage, sickness
or other family reasons.
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TABLE 24
Argentina: Active household strategies
% of households using % of households that reported
a loss of income using
Labour-market strategies   
Bringing new workers into the labour market 13.4 16.1
Working more hours 14.8 19.2
Time   
Increasing production at home 59.9 62.6
Dispensing with/cutting back on domestic servicea 35.3 40.4
Migration 4.1 3.9
a The percentage for this item refers to households for which this category is relevant.
TABLE 25
Argentina: Active household strategies, by income level
Quintile I II III IV V Total
Labour-market strategies  
Bringing new workers into the labour market 28.0 16.8 12.2 6.2 1.4 12.9
Working more hours 11.4 15.6 16.3 11.5 13.4 13.7
Time       
Increasing production at home 74.4 73.0 62.6 52.5 43.2 61.1
Dispensing with/cutting back on domestic servicea . . 43.0 27.8 40.5 37.9
Migration 4.3 2.3 6.0 5.1 4.6 4.5
a The percentage for this item refers to households for which this category is relevant.
TABLE 26
Argentina: Use of financial strategies
% of households opting to % of households that reported a loss of income opting to
 Now Before October 2001 Now Before October 2001
Sell assets 3.7 1.1 5.5 1.0
Use savings 5.1 3.0 7.1 4.9
Borrow from banks 1.7 2.4 1.3 3.1
Buy on credit 7.3 5.1 9.7 6.6
TABLE 27
Argentina: Use of financial strategies,
by income level
Quintile I II III IV V Total
Selling assets 5.9 3.7 3.3 2.7 1.1 3.3
Using savings 2.8 3.5 4.0 8.0 5.6 4.8
Borrowing from banks 0.9 3.6 1.8 0.6 2.0 1.8
Buying on credit 14.6 13.1 9.5 2.3 0.7 8.0
the lowest quintile tend to be net recipients and those
in the highest quintile net givers.
Retrospective questions were used to identify
changes in access to or use of social networks since
October 2001. While the survey revealed an increase
in various forms of social network use, the greatest
increases were in the use of barter and participation in
community activities.
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The degree to which barter is used in low-income
groups is made evident by the fact that the per capita
income of households using it is less than the average
for the population as a whole (143 pesos as against 214,
and 183 pesos as against 264, with and without adult-
equivalent adjustment, respectively). Households using
barter tend to have more unemployed members (43.3%
as against 22.4%) and more temporary workers (42% as
against 23%), which is further proof of their vulnerability.
A similar  pat tern is  observed for  those
households that report receiving some type of
official help. Their per capita income is below
average (122.7 pesos and 97.62 pesos, with and
without adult-equivalent adjustment), they have a
higher incidence of unemployment (65% have an
unemployed member), and those members that are
employed are more likely to have temporary
jobs (80%).
TABLE 28
Argentina: Use of social network strategies
% of households using % of households that reported
a loss of income using
Assistance from other people not living in the housea 16.3 17.0
Borrowing from friends or family 10.7 13.7
Social plans 6.9 7.5
Participation in community activitiesb 20.9 26.4
Barter 11.1 15.2
Using at least one of these strategies 37.0 42.5
Using more than one 14.6 19.9
a A higher percentage of households (22%) claimed to provide assistance to people living in different households.
b Community activities include the following: school canteens, soup kitchens, community purchasing of goods, community workshops,
fund-raising and community childcare, among others.
TABLE 29
Argentina: Use of social network strategies, by income level
Quintile I II III IV V Total
Assistance from other people not living in the house 26.4 15.5 20.9 15.8 7.3 17.1
Assistance to other people not living in the house 10.0 19.7 17.1 21.2 37.9 21.2
Borrowing from friends or family 21.2 15.7 10.6 5.8 3.0 11.3
Social plans 18.5 6.1 7.5 1.3 0.1 6.7
Participation in community activities 29.4 23.6 22.8 15.7 15.7 21.4
Barter 20.2 15.4 11.7 5.5 3.9 11.3
TABLE 30
Argentina: Changes in the use of social networks
% of households using % of households using
before October 2001
Assistance from other people not living in the house 16.3 13.2
Borrowing from friends or family 10.7 7.0
Assistance from government or NGOs 6.9 2.7
Participation in community activities 20.9 11.1
Barter 11.0 3.2
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IV
Conclusions
This paper presents a variety of evidence for the magnitude
of the social costs entailed by the Argentine economic
crisis and its adverse effects at all income distribution
levels. Household-level data confirm the negative picture
yielded by analysis of the macroeconomic indicators
available since early in the year.
Households are using a variety of coping strategies
to respond to what is an intense crisis. The limited
consumption data collected are not enough to establish
the extent to which falling incomes are resulting in
extreme forms of deprivation (i.e., the extent to which
families’ coping strategies are enabling them to avoid
serious constraints). However, the scale of the shocks
and the limitations on the effectiveness of the various
coping mechanisms identified suggest that the effects
on welfare are indeed very serious. The evidence points
to greater effects on the use of health services than of
education services, a conclusion that is being analysed
in more detail using other sources of information.
A rapid comparison with events in other countries
that have experienced similarly large economic shocks
reveals some very interesting similarities as well as
some specific differences. Fallon and Lucas’s analysis
(2002) of the effects on labour markets19  indicates a
pattern of rising open unemployment rates and major
changes in the sectoral composition of employment
(sharp reductions in construction and manufacturing, the
latter as the corporate sector is hit by the higher costs of
imported materials, difficulties in obtaining credit and
the rising burden of foreign-currency debt) similar to
what has been observed in post-convertibility Argentina.
Evidence relating to the distributional impact of
crises shows some differences between countries.
Thomas, Frankenberg and others (1999) estimated that
in the case of Indonesia per capita expenditure fell by
more in the top and bottom quintiles of the distribution
than among households in the middle of the distribution
scale. In Thailand, by contrast, there is evidence of
modest redistribution of income from the middle-
income to the high-income classes. The data analysed
in the present work suggest that the decline of family
income in Argentina has affected the middle class most.
Regarding coping strategies, Thomas, Frankenberg
and others (1999) note that in Indonesia (as in the case
of Argentina now) informal assistance from friends and
family members was particularly important during the
crisis, with about a quarter of all households receiving
such assistance. Its mean value was considerably higher
than that of assistance from official services. Sudarno,
Wetterberg and Pritchett (1999) also found that coping
strategies in Indonesia differed by income level. For
instance, middle-class families responded by working
longer hours, reducing consumption, drawing down
savings and selling assets, while lower-income
households resorted to more drastic measures, such as
taking their children out of school.
Regarding this last point, the evidence is mixed.
In Mexico during the 1982 crisis, for example,
secondary school drop-out rates increased slightly while
primary school drop-out rates fell. Both changes were
part of long-term trends throughout the 1980s (Lustig,
1998). Similarly, Adam and Chamberlin (1999) did not
find evidence of significant reductions in school
participation in Thailand, although they too recognized
the measurement difficulties and delayed responses that
have been mentioned here. The evidence for Thailand,
though, did find a gap in drop-out rates between poor
and non-poor households, something that could also
be identified (although not with precision) in the case
of Argentina.
Lastly, even though the current crisis is much
greater in scale than those experienced during the 1990s,
the general characteristics of the coping strategies being
seen now are very similar to those identified in previous
studies on Argentina (World Bank, 2001), particularly
the reliance on social networks and the changes in
consumption patterns.
The next steps in this ongoing analysis will include
more detailed studies of the impact of the crisis on
health and education services, a more systematic
analysis of the use of different coping strategies by
household type (using multivariate methods), more
specific consideration of the rural sector –making use
of the unique coverage of this survey– and a particular
focus on the role of migration as a coping strategy.
19 The countries analysed and their crisis years, in reverse
chronological order, are: Indonesia (1998), Republic of Korea
(1998), Malaysia (1998), Thailand (1997), Argentina (1995),
Mexico (1995) and Turkey (1994).
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